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I. Introduction and Summary Conclusion
A.

Issue
This memorandum seeks to answer whether a Superior may be charged and

convicted for crimes by his subordinates if in fact no subordinate is actually named or
convicted of the criminal charge.
B.

Summary of Conclusions
The International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR”) gives the

Chamber the authority to hold one responsible for crimes of others so long as certain
prerequisites are established.2 These prerequisites, set forth in Article 6(3) of the ICTR
Statue, require that a chain of control be found, that the superior have knowledge of his
subordinates’ actions and that the superior had failed to prevent the crimes or punish the
perpetrator.3 International Tribunal Chambers and domestic criminal Courts have, in the
past, convicted individuals for crimes committed by their subordinates, if and only if the
above three preconditions were established. Yet the precedents do not require that the
Subordinate be named in the indictment or convicted as a prerequisite to convicting the
Superior under the doctrine of command responsibility. Thus, as one can see there
should be no problem for the Tribunals to support a finding of guilt for superiors, with
out there first being a charge or conviction upon the subordinate.

II.

Factual Background
In the wake of the horrific atrocities committed in Rwanda, from late 1990

2

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453rd mtg., U.M. Doc. S/REE/955 (1994). (TAB A)
5

through 1994,4 the International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda was set up to prosecute
violations of war crimes.5 Since the killings were so widespread and overwhelmingly
quick and undocumented,6 the specific individuals who committed these offenses against
international law cannot be named in all cases.7 It is the superiors of these individuals
who are charged with individual criminal responsibility under article 6(1) of the ICTR8
and responsibilities of commanders and other superiors under article 6(3) of the ICTR.9
III.

Legal Discussion

A.
Comparing All Relative International Statutes Which Make Provisions for
Superior- Subordinate Culpability
It is important to have a sense of how the ICTR came into being in order to better
understand the doctrine of Superior Responsibility. The early Statutes that address this
question established the foundation for which the ICTR rests. The statute that is directly
at issue and used by the prosecutor in Rwanda is the ICTR Statue.

The superior

responsibility provision is derived from article 6(3), which states in pertinent part:
The fact that any of the acts ... committed by a subordinate does not
relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility, if he or she knew or
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts, or
had done so in a superior field to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts, or to punish the perpetrators thereof.10
This statute is directly derived from article 7(3) of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY Statue). These statutes are aimed at putting an end to such
3

See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 2.
See Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998).
5
See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda - Preamble. (TAB A)
6
See International Review of the Red Cross #835, 30 September 1999, pages 531-553 cp.1 (visited March
1, 2001) <http://www.icrc.org>. (TAB V)
7
See Resolution 827 (1993) adopted by the Security Counsel at its 3,217th. (visited February 15, 2001)
<http://gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s93/28>. (TAB B)
8
See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 2. (TAB A)
9
Id.
4
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crimes that seriously threaten international peace and security and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.11
The ICTR and ICTY statutes are rooted in previous international treaties, which
had attempted to address the issue of command responsibility.

One of the earliest

attempts to punish superiors was the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, in its articles
228 and 229.12 The Treaty of Versailles established the right of the allied powers to try
and punish individuals responsible for “violations of the laws and customs of war.”13
Additionally, with the Hague Convention IV, of October 18, 190714, and the Geneva Red
Cross Convention of 1929,15 the issue of superior responsibility was beginning to take
root, but still left the standard somewhat vague.
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that command
responsibility was more clearly defined. One of the first treaties to impose a duty upon
commanders was the 1977 Additional Protocol I, to the Geneva Convention of 12 August
1949.16 Article 87 of this Protocol provides that commanders shall take such steps that
are necessary to prevent violations of the Geneva Convention.17 Also, Article 86 of the
Protocol imposes liability on a commander for his failure to act and take measures
necessary to suppress breaches of the Geneva Conventions, if such a superior knew or
had information which should have enabled them to conclude breaches were being

10

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 2. (TAB A)
See Resolution 827, supra.
12
See Article 28 &29 of the ICC (TAB F)
13
International Review of the Red Cross, supra at 531-553.
14
See Hague Convention No. IV, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295.
15
See Geneva Convention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092. (TAB D)
16
See Protocol I 12 August 1949, U.N.T.S. No 17512, vol. 1125, 3. (TAB C)
17
Article 87- Duty of Commanders, See Protocol I 12 August 1949 (TAB F)
11
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committed.18 It is from these early attempts to classify command responsibility that the
ICTY and ICTR’s language has been drafted in Articles 7(3) and 6(3), respectfully.
Most recently, the 1998 Rome State of the International Criminal Court, building
upon the Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and utilizing the success that Tribunals
have had with the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, expressly states three elements that would
impose liability upon a superior.19

These three elements are: 1) that a superior-

subordinate relationship existed; 2) the required knowledge of the acts was present; and
3) there was a failure to prevent/punish crimes committed by such subordinates.20
B.

Review of Judgments involving International Statutes
The early cases from former Courts and Tribunals have addressed the Superior

Responsibility Doctrine and has not once required a finding of convection on such
subordinates before imposing liability upon their superiors. It was from these early cases
that the precedent for the ICTR was established.
The first such case that attempted to bring justice against commanders who
abused their authority took place in 1474, against Peter Von Hagenbach.21

Von

Hagenbach had permitted and encouraged his soldiers to reduce the population of
Breisach (a fortified city on the upper Rhine), to total submission through acts of brutality
and terror.22

Without any mention of specific individuals except Von Hagenbach

himself, the Military Court stated that the accused had “trampled under foot, the laws of

18

See Article 86- Failure to act, See Protocol I 12 August 1949 (TAB F)
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 July (1998),
reprinted in 37 I.LM.999 (1998). (visited February 18, 2001)
<http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm>. (TAB E)
20
See id., Article 28(1) (a) and (b) (TAB E)
21
See International Review of Red Cross, supra note 13, at page 1 (TAB V)
22
See id., at page 2
19
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God and man” and found him guilty.23 He was subsequently executed for committing
crimes which he had a “duty to prevent.”24 Nevertheless, it was not until the Nuremberg
and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals following World War II that the international
community convicted on the theory of command responsibility.25

However, these

tribunals did not explicitly contain a command responsibility provision.26 They did,
however, establish a foundation for later tribunals and statutes to apply liability upon
commanders for the criminal acts committed by their subordinates.27
The most cited and discussed post World War II case is that against General
Yamashita.28 This case engages considerable controversy both for procedural issues and
for the principle of liability, upon which General Yamashita was convicted, which rested
on a theory of command responsibility.29 The court’s major breakthrough in In Re
Yamashita30 was the establishment of the duty to prevent.31 Yamashita was charged with
violating the laws of war, for his failure to “take such appropriate measures as are within
his power, to control the troops under his command and for the prevention of acts which
are violations of the law of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile
territory by an uncontrolled soldiery; and may be charged with personal responsibility for
his failure to take such measures when violations result.”32 The Yamashita court
expanded the principals established in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, which
23

Id.
See id.
25
See Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal
Court, 25 Yale J. Int’l. 89 at 103 (Winter 2000). (TAB N)
26
Id.
27
White & Case Memorandum 30 August 2000 at 14, Note 3a. (TAB O)
28
See Vetter, supra note 25, at 105.
29
Id.
30
In Re Yamashita, , 327 U.S. 1; 66 S.Ct. 340; 1946 U.S. Lexis 3090; 90 L.Ed. 499 (1946). (TAB M)
31
See Vetter, supra note 25, at 105.
24
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provides that an army must be “commandeered by a person responsible for his
subordinates” and such commanders must see that these article are “properly carried
out.”33 Even without any subordinate being named on the indictment the court ultimately
found General Yamashita guilty for his failure “to provide effective control of ... his
troupes, as required by the circumstances.”34 Despite the lack of evidence that General
Yamashita had actual knowledge that these crimes were being committed, he alone was
held liable on the basis that he should have known the crimes were being committed.35
The commission further stated, “where murder, rape, vicious, and revengeful actions are
widespread offenses, and there is no attempt by a commander to discover and control the
criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable for the
criminal acts of his troops, depending on the nature and circumstances surrounding
them.”36 This case was one of the first cases to establish the principle that knowledge can
be inferred. “Obviously, charges triable before a military tribunal [for violations of war]
need not be stated with the precision of a common law indictment.”37
Another powerful case occurred in the Tokyo tribunal, wherein Foreign Minister
Koki Hirota, was found responsible for the Rape of Nanking, and subsequent atrocities
due to his knowledge of same, and his failure to institute immediate actions against
them.38 Hirota subordinates were not subject to judgment for their crimes committed, a
fact which did not deter the Court from convicting Hirota of superior responsibility even
32

See Yamashita, supra note 30, at ***2-3 n.3(a). (TAB M)
See id., at ***26.
34
See id., at ***40.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See id. at***30.
38
Hirota v. MacArthur, General of the Army, Et Al. 338 U.S. 197; 69 S. Ct.197; 1948 U.S. LEXIS 1428;
93 L. Ed. 1902; See White, note 27, at 24. (TAB Z)
33
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with out a finding of direct control over the perpetrators of the atrocities.39 His guilt is
derived from the fact that he had the ability and duty to prevent and failed to execute his
obligation.40 The Hirota case, along with Yamashita, expanded the doctrine of command
responsibility by allowing for criminal liability to be imposed on those leaders in
instances where neither direct orders were given or where the subordinates were not
under the direct control of such superior,41 so long as the superior had the ability to
prevent the criminal acts.42
The ICTY and ICTR further expanded and defined the principals established in
the World War II Tribunals. Ruling on the newly established statutes and recognizing the
importance of the command responsibility doctrine, each tribunal has explicitly provided
for such liability even without a conviction first being applied to a subordinate.43 The
ICTY in Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delaic, et al., (the Celebici case)44 held that military
commanders and other persons occupying positions of authority may be held criminally
responsible for the unlawful conduct of their subordinates.45 The Tribunal explicitly
stated that this liability is a “well-established norm of customary and conventional
international law.”46 More recently, Prosecutor v. Akayesu,47 also held that superiors can
and must be convicted of these crimes.48

These cases established the principle of

Superior Responsibility and set forth the elements which impose liability on superiors for
39

See id. at 17.
Id.
41
See id. at 17.
42
See Yamashita, supra note 30, at***23. (TAB M)
43
See Vetter, supra note 25, at 94-95.
44
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T(1998), (herein referred to as Celebici). (TAB J)
45
See id. at para.333
46
Id.
47
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998. (TAB I)
48
See id. at para. 551
40
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the unlawful acts performed by their subordinates.

C.

The elements which make up a Superior-Subordinate relationship as
established by statutes, former tribunals and Criminal Courts.
There are three essential elements, which have evolved over time, that are
necessary to impose liability on superiors for the criminal acts of their subordinates under
the principals of the command/superior-subordinate relationship. These elements are as
follows:
(1)

The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;

(2)

The superior knew or had reason to know that the
criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and

(3)

The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.49

1.

The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
A superior-subordinate relationship should be viewed as a “hierarchy

encompassing the concept of control.”50 Although, this type of relationship may be
difficult to recognize, it has remained the most important and essential element in finding
superiors accountable for acts of their subordinates.51 The Delalic Chamber found that in
order to be considered a commander subjected to liability for the crimes of subordinates,
there must be proof that it was within the commanders’ powers to prevent and punish the
acts of such subordinates.52 The Chamber in Blaskic has since characterized a superior as
a person exercising “effective control” over his subordinates.53 Furthermore, Article 28
(1) of the ICC Military Command standard states, “a military commander shall be
49

See Celebici, supra note 44, para. 346 (TAB J)
Protocol I at note 16. (TAB C)
51
See Celebici, supra note44 at para. 354. (TAB J)
52
See id.
50
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criminally responsible for crimes ... committed by forces under his or her effective
command or control.”54 It seems important to note that in none of the Statutes or Treaties
or holding in any case have there been a need to formally charge or convict a subordinate
before liability can be placed upon the superior.
This responsibility is not limited to individuals formally designated as a
commander through de jure control, but also includes individuals who have effective de
facto control as well.55 De jure power is that control over a subordinate by means of
allocation through official ranks.56 De Facto control is defined as the actual control one
has over another where there is no formal delegation of power.57 In order to “pierce the
veil of formalism,” the chamber must be prepared to look further than one’s de jure
powers and consider the de facto authority one actually exercised.58 Accordingly, this
control can be shown whether the commander had actual de jure control or effective de
facto control over the person who in fact committed such acts.59 Therefore, a superior
may incur criminal responsibility for crimes committed by persons who are not formally
under his control.60
Since the doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the
power of the accused (superior) to control his subordinate,61 there is extra incentive for

53

See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, n.335. (TAB K)
Vetter, supra note 25 at 114. (TAB N)
55
See Blaskic, supra note 53 at para. 300. (TAB K)
56
Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, v. 93 American Journal of
International Law no.3, July 1999, note 37 at 4. (visited February 15, 2001)
<http://www.asil.org/bantekas.htm>. (TAB Q)
57
See id. at para. 370.
58
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T 21 May 1999. n.218 (hereinafter Kayishema) (TAB
L)
59
See id. para. 223.
60
See id. para. 301.
61
See Kayishema, supra note 58 at para. 92 (TAB L)
54
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the commander to exercise control over his subordinates and to make certain potential
crimes in the future do not take place.62 The chamber in Akayesu held “that it is
appropriate to assess on a case by case basis, the power of authority actually devolved
upon the accused in order to determine whether or not he had the power to take all
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of the alleged crimes or to
punish the perpetrators thereof.”63 Hence, the doctrine of command responsibility is
ultimately predicted upon the power of the superior to control the dealings of his
subordinates.64
In addition, the authority to prosecute commanders for acts of their subordinates
is not limited to the role of military commander alone.65 This authority also extends to
civilian superiors if such crimes committed were actually within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior.66 The chamber in Celebici concluded that
civilian superiors are only liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, to the
extent that they operate in a military-like degree of control over their subordinates.67 The
Celebici Chamber, using Article 7(2), stated that the doctrine of superior responsibility
“extends beyond the responsibility of military and encompasses political leaders and
other civilian superiors in positions of authority.”68 This judgment is the first elucidation
of the concept of command responsibility by an international judicial body since the
cases decided in the wake of the Second World War.69
62

See Vetter, supra note 35 at 93 (TAB N)
Akeyesu, supra note 47 at para. 491. (TAB I)
64
See Kayishema, supra note 58 para. 217. (TAB L)
65
See Vetter, supra note 25 at 114; citing ICC Article 28 (2)(b) (TAB N & E)
66
See id.
67
See Vetter, supra note 25 at 116. (TAB N)
68
Celebici supra note 356. (TAB J)
69
See Vetter, supra note 25 at 110. (TAB N)
63
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In light of the above, the doctrine of command responsibility encompasses not
only military commanders, but also civilians holding positions of authority and, not only
persons in de jure positions, but also those in de facto positions.70

It is therefore

sufficient for a chamber to find one having a superior status and thus responsibility, if it
can be shown that the accused had either de jure or de facto authority and that the
atrocities were committed subsequent to his orders.71
2.
The superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to
be or had been committed
The Celebici Chamber has defined two theories of knowledge which would give
rise to liability for superior responsibility.72

These theories are known as actual

knowledge and implied knowledge.73 Actual knowledge can be established from direct
evidence that a superior ordered or was aware of the crimes being committed by his
subordinates.74 The Celebici Chamber has further held that absent this direct evidence,
knowledge can still be established through circumstantial evidence.75

This form of

implied knowledge may not be presumed and may only be established through the
evidence pertaining to each individual defendant.76

The philosophy behind allowing

the courts to use circumstantial evidence in order to prove one’s knowledge seems to be
derived from the principle that “a superior is not permitted to remain willfully blind to the
acts of his subordinates.”77
Many chambers have established guidelines for appropriate circumstantial
70

See Celebici, supra note 44. (TAB J)
See Kayishema, supra note 58 para. 218. (TAB L)
72
See Celebici, supra para. 348 (TAB J)
73
See id. at para. 386.
74
See id. at para.386
75
See id.
76
See id. at para. 385
71
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evidence that can be used to infer such knowledge. The Delaic chamber used the final
report of the commission of experts for its guideline.78 A reproduction of this list is as
follows:
a) The number of illegal acts;
b) The type of illegal acts;
c) The scope of illegal acts;
d) The time during which the illegal acts occurred;
e) The number and type of troops involved;
f) The logistics involved, if any;
g) The geographical locations of the acts;
h) The widespread occurrence of the acts;
i) The tactical tempo of operations;
j) the modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
k) the officers and staff involved; and
l) the location of the commander at the time.79
This is not a form of strict liability, but rather a detailed look at exactly what happened
and what the commander did know or should have known from the circumstances to
establish guilt under the doctrine of command responsibility.80
Moreover, the Kayishema chamber, relying on Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statue,
held that when an act was committed by a subordinate, the superior would not be able to
relieve himself from such responsibility if in fact he knew or had reason to know that
such criminal act(s) was about to be committed or had in fact been committed.81 Article
6(3) of the ICTR Statue holds a superior responsible “if he knew or had reason to know”

77

Celebici, supra note 44 at para. 387 (TAB J)
See id. at para. 386
79
See Celebici, supra para. 386. (TAB J)
80
See id. at note 383.
81
See Kayishema, supra note 58 para. 208. (TAB L)
78
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of criminal acts of his subordinates.82 This form of mens rea is required in every major
treaty and statute that addresses the command responsibility doctrine.

The ICTR has

required this standard as a result of the foundations laid down in the Trials of Nuremberg,
Article 28 of the ICC, and Protocol I of the Geneva Convention (Article 87 and Article
86).83 The language in these statutes allows a sufficient degree of flexibility for courts to
find knowledge without directly ruling that a commander actually possessed this
knowledge element.84
The most notable and often cited case to establish and convict a commander
through implied knowledge is the Yamashita case. General Yamashita was the Japanese
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group during World War II.85 While
General Yamashita was isolated in a secluded mountainous region and his
communications were destroyed by the actions of his enemies,86 his troops had succeeded
in carrying out “brutal atrocities and other high crimes.”87 Despite the fact that the
military commission could not find that Yamashita possessed actual knowledge of these
crimes, he was still convicted of violating the laws of war.88 Yamashita was convicted in
the absence of de facto control over his troops, who committed such large-scale atrocities
because he failed to take reasonable measures to secure such information.89

His

conviction was upheld using the balancing test of knowledge and capacity to act.90 The
court satisfied the knowledge element on the fact that the crimes were so widespread and
82

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 2. (TAB A)
See Kayishema, supra para. 209. (TAB L)
84
See id. at para. 208.
85
See Yamashita, supra note 30, at***1. (TAB M)
86
See Bantekas, supra note 56 at. 9. (TAB Q)
87
Yamashita, supra note 30, at***23 (TAB M)
88
See id.
89
See Bantekas, supra note 56 at. 9. (TAB Q)
83

17

that Yamashita failed to attempt a reasonable discovery of these crimes.91 General
Yamashita’s conviction is a perfect example of the idea that a commander may not
escape liability through “willful blindness.”92 This presumption of knowledge seems to
have been established through statute and case judgments because ignorance and inaction
should not relieve a commander of responsibility when it is later impossible to determine
who committed the specific crime.93
3.

Effective control and failure of one’s duty
The last element necessary to establish the liability of a superior for crimes

committed by his subordinates is inaction. One may not wash his hands of international
responsibility by not acting.94 There are two ways a commander may be tried of the
atrocities of his subordinates.95 The first and most straightforward way is when the
superior actually ordered or encouraged the alleged brutality.96 When it is not clear
whether or not there was an order from the accused, the Chamber must turn to the second
and more complicated way to prove command responsibility.

The second method

focuses on the actions the accused took following such atrocities.97
This duty on commanders, who possessed knowledge of their subordinates’
criminal acts, was instilled into the law of war as it was utilized in the charge and
ultimate conviction of General Yamashita.98 The Yamashita Court exclaimed that the
law of war imposes a duty upon an army commander to take all available measures which
90

See id. at 10
See id.
92
Celebici, supra note 44 at para. 387. (TAB J)
93
See id.
94
See id.
95
See Kayishema, supra note 58 at para. 223. (TAB L)
96
See id.
97
See id.
91
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are within his power “in order to control the troops under his command for the prevention
of acts which are violations of the law of war and which are likely to attend the
occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldierly; and may be charged with
personal responsibility for his failure to take such measures when violations result.”99
This duty to act appears to have found its way into every major treaty and statute
regarding command responsibility. The Protocol I of the Geneva Convection deeded
Articles 86100and 87101 to this duty. Also, the ICTR has placed this duty in Article
6(3).102 More notably, this duty is set forth in Article 28(1)(b) of the ICC.103 As one can
perceive, every major statute has set conditions for commanders to be found responsible
even when they did not issue an order or participate any way in the crimes by their
subordinates.
This past authority suggest that knowledge and intent can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence.104 The Tokyo Tribunal found Foreign Minister Hirota guilty
because he “recklessly disregarded his legal duty to take adequate steps to prevent
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breaches of the laws and customs of War.”105 Hirota was responsible for the mayhem
known as the “Rape of Nanking,” where hundreds of murders, violations of women and
other atrocities were committed daily.106 Foreign Minister Hirota was found to have
possessed de jure control over the troops because he had the requisite knowledge of what
was occurring and was convicted because he had failed to put a stop to these crimes
when it was in his power to do so.107
The Hirtota case is one of many cases which have found culpability on a superior
culpable because the superior had the power to stop these types of crimes and did not
exert it. The Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita also imposed on an army commander
a duty to control his troops by taking appropriate measures within his power.108 The
Celebici Chamber analyzing the Yamashita case used the ruling that the “widespread
nature of the crimes committed was prima facie evidence that [Yamashita] must have
failed to fulfill the duty to discover the standard of conduct of his troops” to hand out
convictions accordingly.109
Perhaps the case most on point for this analysis is that of Tihomir Blaskic who
was prosecuted under article 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY.110 The Trial Chamber found that
article 7(3) “enshrines” the principle that liability for command responsibility should be
found where the accused did not prevent the crimes of his subordinates or if appropriate,
to punish them for such crimes and such liability should be construed in the “strictest
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sense.”111 The Chamber found that Blaskic “never took any reasonable measures to
prevent the crimes from being committed or to punish those responsibility thereafter.”112
Impressively, the Chamber found Blaskic guilty even though “no soldier has ever been
convicted for the specific crimes.”113

The Chamber also expressed its difficulty in

believing that the “accused had no forehand knowledge of the attack planned in an area
coming within his area of responsibility and only a few kilometers from his
headquarters.”114
Like the pervious elements, failure to act is not viewed as a strict liability
offense.115 A superior can not be required to perform the impossible.116 He may only be
found to be responsible if it was within his powers to control such actions and he was
negligent in his duty to bring to a halt the crimes being committed.117
There is also a requirement that a commander shall anticipate the actions of his
subordinates before any misbehavior occurs, as he shall be found liable if the
transgression occurs and such commander in fact failed to perceive such results.118 A
recent finding by the Intentional community deriving guilt through the actions of
subordinates conducted as a result of their commanders failure to take the necessary steps
to avoid is found in the Kahan Commission.119 The Kahan Commission ruling over the
Israeli massacres at two Palestinians refugee camps in Lebanon rendered the Israeli Chief
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of Staff and the Israeli Defense Minister responsible for the wrongdoing that was
committed by the Israeli army.120 The Commission found fault because the superiors
failed to take into account such factors as “the age, training, experience or similar
elements that point to obvious conclusions that such crimes would almost certainly
occur.”121 Even without the direct offenders from the Israeli army named the superiors
were found responsible for not anticipating the potential dangers which were well within
their powers to prevent.122 The reason why the superiors were found guilty is not because
of troop x’s actions but rather because of the non-action of the superiors, this is the bases
for liability upon the Israeli Chief of Staff and the Israeli Defense Minister.123
Consequently, in order for the theory of superior responsibility to apply, it is
absolutely necessary for a Tribunal to find that the accused have “effective control” over
his subordinates and their implied duty to act was not fulfilled.124 Such control can be de
jure or de facto.125
Causation between the superior’s failure to act and the subsequent crimes by their
subordinates has been a difficult connection for the Tribunals to apply.126 However,
Tribunals have not required a separate element of causation to support a finding of
command responsibility.127 There is a necessary causal nexus when charging one with
superior responsibility for the failure to act.128 Such a nexus can be shown through
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circumstantial evidence.129 The Celebici chamber ruled that there is no requirement to
prove causation as a separate element for superior responsibility.130

Reaching this

conclusion, the Celebici Chamber considered the “existing body of case law,” principles
set forth in “existing treaty law” and the “abundant literature on this subject.”131 The
Chamber went future and declared “the very existence of the principle of superior
responsibility for failure to punish, therefore, recognized under Article 7(3) and
customary law, demonstrates the absence of a requirement of causality as a separate
element of [this doctrine].”132
D.
Comparing similar relationships and offences to that of the superiorsubordinate relationship.
The question of whether one can be charged with responsibility for the criminal
acts of his subordinates, if such subordinates have not been either charged or convicted of
the crime, has not been decisively answered. It is helpful to look at similar laws and see
how the international community has decided this query.
Article 2 of the ICTR gives the Tribunal for Rwanda the power to prosecute
persons committing genocide,133 this article also allows the prosecution for conspiracy,134
direct and public incitement,135 attempt136 and complicity.137 Additionally, Article 6(1)
makes one criminally responsible if he/she planed, instigated, ordered or aided and
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abetted in such crimes.138
1.

Accomplices Liability
Accomplice liability according to Article 91 of the Rwanda Penal Code allows

liability for complicity by aiding and abetting, complicity by incitement, complicity by
procuring means and complicity for harboring.139 Complicity is defined as “participation
in wrongdoing.”140 The Delalic Chamber, using language found in Article 4 of the
French Ordinance of 28 August 1944, based part of its finding in part on the notion that:
where a subordinate is prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of a war
crime, and his superiors cannot be indicated as being equally responsible,
they shall be considered as accomplices in so far as they have organized or
tolerated the criminal acts of their subordinates.141
Thus, a commander who does not fulfill his duties, as set out under the doctrine of
command responsibility shall be treated as the accomplice of such war criminals.142
To find the accused liable as an accomplice, the Chamber shall look to see if the
accused had knowledge that the war crime(s) were being committed and the accused had
aided and abetted, instigated, or incited one to commit such crime(s) regardless of
whether the accused had specific intent to bring about such crime(s).143 Such knowledge
can additionally be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.144
2.

Aiding and Abetting
In Prosecutor v. Tadic the chamber found that aiding and abetting included “all
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acts of assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support.”145 The Tadic
Chamber also found it necessary to find a degree of knowledge and intent.146 However,
such knowledge and intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
act.147 The Tadic judgment went further to state that “if the presence can be shown or
inferred, by circumstantial or other evidence, to be knowing and to have had a direct and
substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to
base a finding of participation and assign the criminal culpability that accompanies it.”148
Thus one may be found guilty of aiding and abetting for merely being present and not
fulfilling his duty to control.
The Akayesu Chamber relying on this past authority stated that aiding and
abetting could be found when there is a failure to act.149 The definition of aiding is the
‘giving of assistance to someone.’150 The Blaskic Chamber found that as long as the
accused was “aware” that a crime is likely to be committed and the accused has intended
to facilitate its commission, he may be charged with aiding and abetting.151
Aiding and Abetting and the theory for why these findings were found is best
summed up in the Blaskic judgment which stated, “the international tribunal is not
limited to persons who directly committed the crime in question.”152
3.

Incitement to Commit Genocide (Article 2(3)(c) of the ICTR)
The most famous conviction for incitement came against Julisus Streicher by the
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Nuremberg Tribunal.153 Incitement is defined as encouraging or persuading another to
commit an offense,154 even where such incitement fails to produce results.155 Streicher
published anti-Semitic articles in his weekly newspaper through out WWII.156

The

drafters of the 1948 Convention on Genocide referring to Streicher’s case stated, “It is
impossible that hundreds of thousands of people should commit so many crimes unless
they had been instigated to do so.”157 They asked how in those circumstances, the
inciters and organizers of the crime could be allowed to escape punishment when they are
the ones, in actuality responsible for the atrocities committed.158 This seems to be the
rational of why allowing liability without naming or convicting the subordinate first is the
proper course of action.
The issues presented in the Akayesu indictment posed the question of whether “a
person can be tried for complicity even where the perpetrator of the principal offense
himself has not been tried.”159 The Akayesu chamber, using Article 89 of the Rwanda
Penal Code, answered this question in the affirmative.160

The accused “may be

prosecuted even where the perpetrator may not face prosecution for personal reasons,
such as double jeopardy, death, insanity, or non-identification. ... As far as the chamber is
aware, all criminal systems provide that an accomplice may be tried, even where the
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principal perpetrator of the crime has not been identified.”161 There is no conflicting
authority on this subject which suggest otherwise.
The Chamber hearing the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu, found him to have
joined a crowd of over 100 people, and seized the opportunity to address the people.162
The chamber further found that Akayesu urged the population to unite and eliminate the
Tutsi population.163

The chamber found a casual connection between Akayesu’s

speeches and the ensuing widespread massacres of the Tutsi in Taba.164 There was no
mention of any specific person or accomplices in the chamber’s findings, rather language
specifying a “crowd, audience and population,” using these broad terms the chamber
found Akayesu guilty of incitement.165 “Akayesu had the intent to directly create a
particular state of mind in his audience necessary to lead to the destruction of the Tutsi
group,166 ... [A]ccordingly, the chamber finds that the said acts constitute the crime of
direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”167
By looking at these other forms of criminal responsibility which allow for an
accused to be found liable even without a proper connection between the accused
perpetrator and the accused, one can infer that the connection with regard to superior
subordinate responsibility will not be so tantamount to overcome.
IV.

Conclusion
Where no subordinate has been indicted for the specific criminal act and liability

based on the doctrine of command responsibility is sought, liability should not be barred.
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After reviewing this doctrine’s historical roots and the manner in which it has been
applied, there is no benefit for precluding such liability solely because no subordinate has
been named or convicted. The Tribunals in the past have inferred some elements through
circumstantial evidence to impose liability even where such element had not been
overwhelmingly proved.
Since circumstantial evidence has been used in former tribunals and in the
current ICTR to prove elements of this liability, circumstantial evidence should be
allowed to prove responsibility of a superior, if in fact no subordinate had been named.
In sum, so long as the prosecutor can prove that there in fact was a superior-subordinate
relationship, the superior had knowledge of or should have known of the criminal acts of
their subordinates, and subsequently failed to perform his duty to prevent or punish such
subordinate, International War Crimes Tribunals should be able to convict the accused
without hesitation.
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